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Can Sentencing Guidelines Commissions 
Help States Substantially Reduce Mass 
Incarceration? 
Richard S. Frase† 
INTRODUCTION 
In his forthcoming book, Franklin Zimring argues that sen-
tencing guidelines commissions could, if given three additional 
powers, help states substantially reduce their bloated prison 
populations.1 This Article examines the strengths and weak-
nesses of these proposals, while also highlighting the ways in 
which such commissions have already helped some states limit 
excessive growth in their prison populations.  
As always, Professor Zimring clearly identifies a problem—
here, the many drivers of mass incarceration (hereafter: M.I.)—
and suggests thought-provoking solutions. His structural solu-
tion, Minnesota-style sentencing commissions, is already oper-
ating in several states. The ways in which Zimring wants to ex-
pand the role of such commissions may not all work as he 
envisions, at least in some states, but each is worthy of serious 
consideration. 
Part I of this Article summarizes and critiques Zimring’s 
commission-based proposals. Part II explains how, even without 
Zimring’s new commission mandates, guidelines commissions 
have helped some states limit the use of imprisonment. The ar-
gument of that Part is two-fold: first, states that have such com-
missions should maintain them, and other states should follow 
their lead; second, any added commission roles, similar to or dif-
ferent from those that Zimring proposes, must not interfere with 
the valuable tasks these commissions already perform. Subject 
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to that caveat, Part III identifies some further roles that guide-
lines commissions might play (including modified versions of 
Zimring’s three added roles), which could help to roll back M.I. 
The Conclusion summarizes this Article’s main arguments about 
the ways in which guidelines commissions do or could help roll 
back M.I., while also noting that there is much we still don’t 
know about “what works” in pursuing that goal—or even what 
each jurisdiction’s target prison rate should be.  
I.  SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF ZIMRING’S THREE-
PRONGED, COMMISSION-CENTERED PROPOSAL 
Section A describes how Zimring proposes to use sentencing 
guidelines commissions to roll back M.I. by giving those commis-
sions three new kinds of powers and duties and summarizes the 
strengths of the commission model and the overall advantages 
of using commissions in this way. Section B examines, in turn, 
the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal. Section C con-
siders some broader problems with giving guidelines commis-
sions these or other new powers.  
A. EXPANDED POWERS AND DUTIES OF SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES COMMISSIONS 
Zimring proposes to give sentencing commissions, of the 
kind that Minnesota and several other states have created to de-
velop and implement sentencing guidelines,2 three new roles.3 
Under Zimring’s expanded guidelines commission model, these 
commissions would be given power to  
(1) make case-specific prison release (i.e., parole) decisions; 
(2) administer state-funded financial grants and charge-
backs to encourage local government compliance with policies 
 
 2. The federal sentencing commission is less likely to be effective in rolling 
back M.I., given that escalating prison costs remain a tiny fraction of the mas-
sive federal budget. The same is true for some state commissions, due to staffing 
and other limits on their powers and stature. For comparisons of state and fed-
eral guidelines and commissions, see RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 121–41, 163 (2013) 
[hereinafter FRASE, JUST SENTENCING]; Richard S. Frase, Forty Years of Amer-
ican Sentencing Guidelines: What Have We Learned? 48 CRIME & JUST. 79 
(2019) [hereinafter Frase, Forty Years]; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines 
in American Courts: A Forty-year Retrospective, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 109 (2019) 
[hereinafter Frase, Retrospective]. 
 3. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 7 at 28–32). 
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designed to minimize unnecessary prison commitments and 
make greater use of non-prison sentences; and 
(3) collect and publicize data on specific local criminal justice 
policies and practices, especially by prosecutors, that drive up 
prison commitments and prison durations.  
Zimring sees Minnesota-style sentencing commissions as 
the ideal governmental agency to take the lead in rolling back 
M.I., and there is much wisdom in this assessment. As Zimring 
notes, such commissions are located “at the appropriate level of 
government—the state level where prisons are paid for and ad-
ministered.”4 At present, decisions about which offenders to send 
to state prison, and with what prison terms, are made by local 
government officials, i.e., judges and prosecutors. These officials 
are free to consume state prison resources without paying for 
them—a problem Zimring refers to as the “correctional free 
lunch.”5  
Such commissions also have several other important 
strengths as policymaking bodies. Although ultimately subject 
to legislative oversight and override, they enjoy a degree of insu-
lation from short-term political pressures of the law-and-order 
type because they are not elected or under the direct control of 
elected officials.6 They also usually have representatives from all 
major criminal justice stakeholders, giving them a more bal-
anced perspective than the legislature, governor, or judiciary.7 
And like all administrative agencies, sentencing commissions 
can collect data, acquire expertise, and bring an evidence-based, 
comprehensive (all crimes, all geographic areas), and long-term 
perspective to complex public policy questions.8 Furthermore, 
the greater uniformity and predictability of sentencing under 
state-wide guidelines allows sentencing policy to be imple-
mented with improved transparency, consistency, and fiscal re-
sponsibility. These are all important strengths of the sentencing 
commission model, which many states have used to improve sen-
tencing policy and practice.9 Zimring’s decarceration proposals 
build on these strengths. 
 
 4. Id. (manuscript ch. 7 at 28). 
 5. Id. (manuscript ch. 3 at 14). 
 6. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 113. 
 7. Id. at 115–16. 
 8. Id. at 125. 
 9. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 2, at 123–61; MICHAEL TONRY, 
SENTENCING MATTERS 190–96 (1996); Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines 
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The next section will examine the pros and cons of each of 
these proposed new commission roles. Then, Section C will ad-
dress some more general problems posed by all three proposals. 
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF EACH PROPOSED NEW 
COMMISSION ROLE 
Each of Zimring’s proposals has strong arguments in its fa-
vor—each suggests a plausible mechanism to reduce M.I., and 
draws on the guidelines commission strengths summarized 
above. At the same time, each proposal has potential drawbacks 
and limitations.  
1. Giving the Guidelines Commission Control over Prison 
Release (i.e., Parole) Decisions 
Although some sentencing guidelines reforms have abol-
ished parole release discretion, Zimring prefers to retain it, for 
two reasons having to do with the level of government and tim-
ing. A state-level decision maker is able to smooth out disparities 
in sentences imposed by individual judges and in different local-
ities and is also more likely to pay attention to the aggregate 
impacts of prison sentences in terms of prison beds required and 
prison overcrowding.10 As for timing, Zimring argues that when 
specific decisions about each offender’s required time to serve in 
prison are made years after the imposition of sentence, this al-
lows passions to cool, mitigates the tendency of trial court judges 
to impose unreasonably severe prison terms so as to symbolically 
denounce the harms done to victims and communities, and 
makes it possible to factor in offender-specific changed circum-
stances, such as successful completion of rehabilitative prison 
programming and maturation (or the simple fact that older per-
sons are less crime prone).11 
There is much truth in these supposed advantages of retain-
ing parole discretion, although there are also potential disad-
vantages. The history of parole in the United States casts doubt 
on the assumption that entrusting release decisions to a state 
agency helps to promote consistency and avoid unnecessary 
 
at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (2012); 
Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 23–27; Frase, Retrospective, supra note 2, 
at 2–5. 
 10. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 7 at 28). 
 11. Id. (manuscript ch. 7 at 9–12). 
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incarceration.12 Indeed, the available evidence suggests that, 
compared to parole abolition systems, states that retained parole 
discretion were more likely to experience above-average growth 
in their imprisonment rates in the period leading up to peak 
M.I.13  
In theory, a sentencing commission’s release decisions 
should be more consistent and parsimonious than a parole 
board’s, given the institutional strengths of such commissions 
noted above, especially if the commission develops and generally 
follows presumptive releasing guidelines. Commission decisions 
(especially with guidelines) are also likely to be more transpar-
ent than a parole board’s and, given the commission’s more 
broadly representative membership, will arguably be seen as 
more legitimate. But what reason is there to believe that a com-
mission would actually use its new parole-release power to sub-
stantially reduce prison populations? Sentencing commissions 
may be more insulated from direct political pressures than pa-
role boards are, but commissions remain subject to legislative 
oversight and possible revocation of delegated policymaking au-
thority. Unless the legislature gives the commission a specific 
mandate to reduce overall imprisonment, most such commis-
sions are unlikely to try to do so.  
There is also the question of scale—how much scope will 
commissions have to mitigate maximum prison terms imposed 
by judges? Greater mitigation power increases a commission’s 
power to reduce the prison population, but it also risks the re-
turn of politicized, “truth in sentencing” rhetoric—when offend-
ers reappear in the community long before the end of their prison 
terms, actual or opportunistic victims’ advocates may object that 
those terms are being undermined, or are a sham, thus generat-
ing pressure to limit or eliminate “early” release authority.14 
Once upon a time, parole boards operated largely in secret and 
could quietly grant substantial reductions in prison time served, 
 
 12. Kevin R. Reitz, Prison-Release Reform and American Decarceration, 
104 MINN. L. REV. 2741 (2020); see also EBONY L. RUHLAND ET AL., THE CON-
TINUING LEVERAGE OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL 
SURVEY 45 (2016) (observing that most parole boards either have no guidelines 
or give greatest weight to input from prosecutors, victims, and the sentencing 
judge).  
 13. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 118 tbl.2; Reitz, supra note 12. For 
discussion of whether such patterns reflect causation or selection bias, see infra 
at note 45. 
 14. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 118. 
 
 
2786 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2781 
 
allowing the sentencing system to “bark[] louder than it really 
wants to bite.”15 But those days are gone, and will probably not 
return. Moreover, when prison terms are subject to substantial 
later mitigations, judges may feel free to look “tough” and impose 
very long prison terms, relying—perhaps unrealistically—on pa-
role discretion. By contrast, with parole abolition and “real-time” 
sentences subject only to specified good-conduct credits, judges 
(as well as legislators) must take responsibility for the human 
and fiscal costs of lengthy prison sentences. 
Furthermore, some of the claimed advantages of parole dis-
cretion can be achieved by other means once such discretion is 
abolished. Legally binding guidelines for judges can reduce dis-
parities in prison durations across judges and counties (and can 
also reduce disparities in decisions about which offenders are 
sent to prison in the first place).16 As for the problem of timing, 
most of the factors relevant to the appropriate duration of im-
prisonment can be assessed as well or better at the time of sen-
tencing. That is clearly true with regard to case-specific assess-
ments of offense seriousness, under guidelines. As for the risk of 
renewed offending, aging inmates pose substantially lower risks 
(while the costs of holding them in prison are very high, espe-
cially medical costs).17 But advancing age is highly foreseeable; 
a judge at sentencing can know how old each offender will be 
after X years in prison.18 Aside from age, the most reliable pre-
dictor of post-prison recidivism is the offender’s criminal record, 
which is also known at sentencing.19 The next most reliable fac-
tors are probably whether the offender accepted and completed 
assigned prison programming and complied with prison discipli-
nary rules; but parole-abolition guidelines can and do take these 
factors into account by means of good-conduct credits.20  
Admittedly, some kinds of changed circumstances (e.g., ill 
health or a family caretaking crisis) are truly unforeseeable and 
cannot be handled with good-conduct formulas. However, such 
case-specific circumstances (as well the need for broad-scale 
 
 15. Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Con-
sumer’s Guide to Sentencing Reform, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1, 7 (Univ. of Chi. 
Law Sch., No. 12, 1976). 
 16. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 102–05. 
 17. Id. at 93. 
 18. Id. at 119. 
 19. Id. at 91–93. 
 20. Id. at 119. 
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releases to avoid prison overcrowding) can be accommodated by 
the various “second-look” re-sentencing and releasing proce-
dures recommended under the revised Model Penal Code.21 
Granted, these alternative prison-release mechanisms have lim-
ited potential to substantially reduce prison populations. But as 
was noted above, it is not clear that sentencing commissions, if 
granted across-the-board parole release authority, would actu-
ally achieve substantial prison reductions.  
Regardless of how a jurisdiction resolves the policy tradeoffs 
described above, one of the critical needs in any serious decar-
ceration strategy is to reduce the number of offenders who are 
revoked from parole supervision and sent back to prison for vio-
lation of the terms of their release. Such revocations are a major 
contributor to mass incarceration, and substantially cutting 
them back was a major component of the California Realignment 
reforms Zimring points to as a major decarceration success 
story.22 Moreover, for the reasons discussed in the next section, 
a guidelines commission would probably be much better able 
than a parole board to reduce such revocations, in tandem with 
steps the commission could take to reduce revocations to prison 
for violation of probation conditions. The commission could re-
duce both kinds of revocations by implementing guidelines to 
structure not only revocation decisions, but also decisions about 
conditions of release (excessive numbers of conditions increase 
violation rates). 
2. Having Commissions Administer Financial Incentives To 
Encourage Non-Prison Sentences  
In his new book, Zimring returns to a critically important 
insight he made almost thirty years ago23: that a major reason 
why American prison sentences are so frequent and lengthy is 
that sentencing decisions are made by local judges and prosecu-
tors who need not concern themselves about unnecessary use of 
imprisonment because prisons are paid for by the state—the 
“correctional free lunch” problem noted above. Several other 
writers have subsequently addressed this theme, suggesting 
that local officials should be given financial incentives to make 
 
 21. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 305.6, 3.05.7, 3.05.8 (AM. LAW 
INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017). 
 22. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5 at 30–31).  
 23. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISON-
MENT 211–15 (1991). 
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greater use of community-based sentences and less use of state 
prison sentences.24 Zimring’s book likewise proposes a system of 
financial grants to support community sentencing, combined 
with charge-backs when a local jurisdiction fails to comply with 
policies designed to minimize unnecessary prison commit-
ments.25 The new element in Zimring’s book is to have sentenc-
ing guidelines commissions administer these grants and charge-
backs.26  
The subsidy/charge-back concept is a very good idea: many 
local jurisdictions simply lack the resources to increase their use 
of community-based sentences; moreover, such sentences are 
less expensive to operate than prison sentences, so the state will 
save money even if it heavily subsidizes local sentences. And 
charge-backs are needed to address the correctional free lunch 
problem. Zimring is probably also right to conclude that, given 
their previously noted institutional strengths and expertise on 
sentencing issues, guidelines commissions are the best state 
agency to administer this system.27 Such commissions are also 
well equipped to address the related problem of excessive proba-
tion conditions and resulting high rates of revocation to prison 
for violation of those conditions. As with parole revocation, pro-
bation revocations are a major contributor to mass incarcera-
tion.28 Although probation conditions and revocations have 
mostly been ignored or only lightly regulated in American guide-
lines systems, a few systems structure such conditions, and re-
quire or strongly encourage use of local jail or limited prison 
terms to sanction probation violations.29  
To make the subsidy and charge-back system work, the sen-
tencing commission will need to decide how many prison beds 
each local jurisdiction is allowed to take up. On the surface, the 
process is straightforward—the commission’s guidelines define 
which offenders should go to prison and for how long. Based on 
these rules, and on sentencing caseloads, each local jurisdiction 
 
 24. See, e.g., FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 2, at 58; TONRY, supra 
note 9, at 192. 
 25. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 6 at 28–29).  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1019–21 (2013). 
 29. See Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 95–96; Richard S. Frase, Sus-
pended Sentences and Free-Standing Probation Orders in U.S. Guidelines Sys-
tems: A Survey and Assessment, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (2019). 
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can be allocated enough resources to fund all recommended com-
munity-based sentences, and charged for each offender sent to 
prison in violation of the commission’s guidelines.  
However, there is a potential problem with the process de-
scribed above: guidelines recommendations assume a typical 
case and allow departures based on atypical offense and offender 
circumstances. Aggravating case facts justify “upward depar-
ture” as to prison duration and/or prison commitment, thereby 
permitting the imposition of a longer prison term than would 
normally apply and/or immediate commitment to prison of an 
offender who would normally be recommended for a community-
based sentence; mitigating facts justify “downward departure” 
as to prison duration and/or prison commitment. For ease of ad-
ministration, the commission would probably have to simply as-
sume that all counties have identical patterns of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, or that counties with higher rates 
of the former always have compensating higher rates of the lat-
ter. But many counties will strongly contest such assumptions, 
especially when the commission has imposed a charge-back pen-
alty for sending too many offenders to state prison, or for prison 
terms that are too long.  
Alternatively, commissions could attempt to assess which 
upward departures are valid, and also whether a county charged 
with making excessive use of prison sentences is failing to recog-
nize valid grounds for mitigating departure. But this would be a 
time-consuming, staff-intensive process, and to my knowledge 
only the Minnesota guidelines commission has done this kind of 
research. Moreover, the Minnesota research only covered a sam-
ple of counties in two early guidelines years,30 and it used what 
was described as a “conservative” standard designed only to 
identify cases in which departure was deemed “essential . . . to 
achieve proportionality rather than to identify [all] cases in 
which departure might be justifiable.”31 Sentencing proportion-
ality depends on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
of the conviction offense, but all modern punishment systems (in-
cluding Minnesota’s) also recognize crime-control grounds for 
upward and downward departure, based, for example, on assess-
ments of elevated or reduced offender recidivism risk and ame-
nability to probation. When assessing whether departure is war-
ranted, after the fact and based solely on available written case 
 
 30. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNE-
SOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 19–20 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 53. 
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file records, it is probably easier to judge grounds based on of-
fense proportionality than grounds based on offender risk factors 
(which, except for a prior record, are less likely to be consistently 
included in case files). In short, commissions may simply have to 
conclusively presume that each county’s needs for community-
sentence alternatives and state prison beds reflect that county’s 
caseload mix and the corresponding typical-case guidelines sen-
tence recommendations.  
3. Having Commissions Collect and Publicize County Data on 
Excessive Prison Sentencing 
 Zimring proposes to grant Minnesota-style sentencing 
guidelines commissions “[e]xplicit authority to review patterns 
of local criminal justice outcomes.”32 He gives particular empha-
sis to decisions of local prosecutors that drive up prison commit-
ments and durations.33 Zimring views prosecutors as “the real 
power in local sentencing” and notes that, unlike judges’ sen-
tences, prosecutors’ decisions remain largely hidden and escape 
any form of direct appellate scrutiny.34 Zimring further argues 
that “the most significant incentive for prosecutorial compliance 
[with the commission’s prison-use policies] is the presence of a 
fiscal incentive for county governments and the credible prospect 
of its withdrawal.”35 
In order to maximize the effects of such fiscal incentives on 
prosecutors’ decisions, Zimring seems to be saying that commis-
sions should study and publish data on the specific prosecutorial 
decisions and policies, in each local jurisdiction, that contribute 
to excessive prison sentencing and charge-back penalties for the 
county. Such data might include the extent to which certain 
prosecutors, or prosecution offices, exercise their discretion in 
more punitive ways than most other prosecutors with respect to 
matters such as whether mandatory penalties are charged and 
not dismissed in plea bargaining; whether higher-severity of-
fenses are preferred over applicable lower-ranked offenses (i.e., 
charging of higher-ranked felonies, or of felony rather than mis-
demeanor crimes); the number of separate counts charged and 
retained to conviction (which can raise the offender’s future and 
sometimes current criminal history score, while also enabling 
consecutive sentencing); the severity of prosecutorial sentence 
 
 32. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 7 at 28–29). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. (manuscript ch. 7 at 31). 
 35. Id. (manuscript ch. 7 at 32). 
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recommendations; and the extent to which prosecutors invoke 
available diversion options (e.g., drug courts). Tying such prose-
cution decisions to sentences that invoke fiscal penalties for the 
county will help to generate local pressures on chief prosecutors 
and change evaluation criteria for line prosecutors. In a later 
chapter, Zimring argues that such pressures are needed in order 
to counteract the inherent pro-prison biases of American prose-
cutors—the tendency to measure their “success” and the perfor-
mance of line prosecutors according to the number and duration 
of prison sentences imposed.36  
This proposed third new role for sentencing commissions 
makes a lot of sense, not only for the reasons Zimring cites but 
also because it represents a way to finally address a major area 
of unfinished business in sentencing reform. Guidelines regulate 
sentencing decisions by judges, and often abolish or constrain 
prison-release decisions, but do not regulate prosecutorial deci-
sions that strongly influence most of those decisions. Giving local 
jurisdictions and their prosecutors what amounts to a prison-bed 
“budget” at least permits guidelines commissions to regulate ex-
cessively severe prosecutorial decisions and policies. (There is 
less need for regulation of prosecutorial leniency given the pro-
severity biases Zimring identifies.)  
One potential problem is that much of the necessary data 
will be difficult to obtain—prosecutors tend to keep secret the 
inner workings of their charging and plea-bargaining decisions. 
Moreover, it’s not clear that data tying prosecutorial decisions to 
lost state aid for community sentences will have the desired ef-
fect of discouraging unnecessary imprisonment; some prosecu-
tors may welcome such data, as proof of how “tough” they have 
been in fighting crime.  
Some local judges (especially those fearing a re-election 
challenge) may likewise be relatively immune to criticism that 
their policies are costing the county state subsidy money. Still, 
the collection and publication of data showing how decisions by 
county officials (or some of them) translate into prison impacts 
may serve to encourage more moderate policies by local officials 
who recognize that M.I. is a problem and want to do something 
about it. Another defect of the current system is that the aggre-
gate, state-level effects of each county’s sentencing decisions are 
largely invisible to the officials making those decisions.  
 
 36. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 8). 
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Another limitation on the effectiveness of Zimring’s proposal 
is that it does not address a broader and probably more im-
portant prosecution-controlled driver of mass incarceration: the 
large increase—probably by all prosecutors, not just some of 
them—in the number of cases filed and resulting in felony con-
viction. Zimring recognizes this problem and laments the limited 
national-level data on decisions between the arrest and prison-
admissions stages of the criminal process.37 The only reliable na-
tional data on state court felony convictions is for the years 1986 
to 2006, and it shows that such convictions almost doubled over 
this time period: from an estimated 582,764 convictions in 1986 
to 1,132,290 in 2006.38 As will be discussed later, some of the 
increase in felony cases probably reflects public pressure to take 
certain criminal behaviors more seriously. But how can a sen-
tencing commission—or any public body—decide, for a given ju-
risdiction, how many felony convictions is the right number? 
C. SOME BROADER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT OF 
NEW ROLES TO SENTENCING COMMISSIONS 
No sentencing commission has ever had the three new roles 
Zimring wants to give them. And although many commissions 
have been directed to avoid prison overcrowding39 (which in turn 
tends to produce slower prison growth), only two commissions—
in North Carolina and Alabama—appear to have played a major 
role in facilitating substantial reductions in prison rates or pop-
ulations. In the first four years of sentencing under North Caro-
lina’s legally binding guidelines (1995–1999), that state’s prison 
rate declined by twelve percent, whereas the rate had increased 
by forty-one percent in the four years before guidelines adop-
tion.40 And in the first four years after 2013, when Alabama con-
verted from advisory to legally binding guidelines for most non-
violent crimes, the prison rate declined by twenty-five percent (it 
had remained essentially unchanged in the four years before 
 
 37. Id. (manuscript ch. 2). 
 38. CARLA K. GASKINS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY CASE PRO-
CESSING IN STATE COURTS, 1986, at 2 tbl.1 (1990); ROSENMERKEL ET AL., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 3 tbl.1 (2010); see also JOHN F. 
PFAFF, LOCKED IN 2 fig.1 (2017). 
 39. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 87–88. 
 40. E. Ann Carson, Imprisonment Rate of Sentenced Prisoners Under the 
Jurisdiction of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps.  
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adoption of binding guidelines).41 In both of these states, prison 
reductions were deliberately chosen, and were primarily 
achieved by guidelines sentence recommendations calling for 
fewer and shorter prison sentences; North Carolina also pro-
vided state aid for community corrections.42 
In addition to the lack of historical precedent, another rea-
son for caution when assigning major new duties to sentencing 
guidelines commissions is the risk that this may overload these 
bodies and/or unduly politicize the very valuable work they are 
already doing (some of which, as further discussed in Part II be-
low, has helped states avoid the worst problems of mass incar-
ceration). Each of the three new duties Zimring proposes will re-
quire substantial additional funding, which may not be provided.  
As for the politicization risk, each of the proposed new duties 
will involve the commission in highly contentious matters: 
granting of “early” release from prison, withdrawal of previously 
awarded funds to local jurisdictions, and publishing of data 
showing how some local officials are causing their counties to 
lose state subsidies for community-based sentencing. Working 
on such matters will attract media and political attention, and 
perhaps increase the salience of all of the commission’s work; 
this in turn could risk undercutting the commission’s relative in-
sulation from electoral politics, which is a major advantage of 
having a sentencing commission.  
II.  EXISTING GUIDELINES COMMISSION ROLES IN 
CONTROLLING OVER-USE OF IMPRISONMENT 
A recent survey of American guidelines systems reported 
that most of these systems experienced slower prison growth, 
from the year they implemented guidelines to the “peak” M.I. 
year, than the all-states average increase in those years.43 How-
ever, this difference was due entirely to slower growth in the 
guidelines systems that eliminated parole release discretion (pa-
role-retention guidelines systems experienced average growth). 
 
 41. Id.; JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017 (Edrienne Su & Jill Thomas 
eds., 2019). 
 42. Ronald F. Wright, Counting the Cost of Sentencing in North Carolina, 
1980–2000, in 29 Crime & Justice: A Review of Research 39, 85–86 (2002); Grif-
fin Edwards et al., The Effects of Voluntary and Presumptive Sentencing Guide-
lines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2019).  
 43. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 110 tbl.2. 
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Only three of the ten parole-abolition guidelines systems had 
above-average growth.44 Moreover, the elevated growth in two of 
those systems, Kansas and Minnesota, was largely explained by 
above-national-average increases in the number of felons being 
sentenced each year, while the above-average growth in federal 
prison populations was due to certain design features of the fed-
eral guidelines, along with few, if any, budgetary constraints 
(prisons account for a tiny fraction of the massive federal 
budget).45  
Of course, correlation does not prove causation. Systems 
were not randomly assigned to guidelines, non-guidelines, and 
guidelines with and without parole discretion—it’s quite possible 
that the slower-growing parole-abolition guidelines systems ben-
efitted from other protective features, besides their sentencing 
structure, that served to limit prison growth. However, there are 
good reasons to believe that having such guidelines did actually 
cause most of these systems to experience slower prison growth. 
Those reasons reflect certain essential features of guidelines sen-
tencing, especially when combined with parole abolition: 
• The essence of recommended sentences under guidelines 
is that they are deemed to be the appropriate sentence for a typ-
ical case of each type,46 not the worst possible case that would 
justify the statutory maximum penalty. Giving judges a typical-
case starting point not only promotes consistency across 
judges,47 it also reminds them that most sentences should be and 
usually are well below the maximum.  
• Under guidelines, judges retain not only the power to de-
part upward (and in unusually aggravated cases, to impose the 
statutory maximum), but also the power to depart downward.48 
And in most guidelines systems with reported data, downward 
departures outnumber upward departures (as would be ex-
pected, given the ubiquity of plea-bargaining).  
• All state guidelines systems base recommended sen-
tences on the crime(s) of which the defendant has been found, or 
pled, guilty;49 this means that judges have limited power to en-
hance sentences based on additional or more serious crimes that 
 
 44. Id. at 118. 
 45. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 108–09; Frase, Retrospective, supra 
note 2, at 7.  
 46. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 82. 
 47. Id. at 115. 
 48. Id. at 97. 
 49. Id. at 90. 
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were dismissed or never charged (without guidelines, judges are 
free to impose such “real-offense” sentence enhancements, and 
in many federal cases the guidelines encourage judges to do so). 
• Under parole-abolition guidelines, offenders serve the 
entire prison term after credit for good behavior and completion 
of assigned prison programming. The use of such “real-time” rec-
ommended and imposed sentences promotes a more honest ap-
proach to punishment decisions (sometimes referred to as “truth 
in sentencing”).50 And while it might seem that the loss of pa-
role’s greater mitigation power would lead to higher rates of 
prison growth, the opposite appears to be the case in practice, at 
least for systems with sentencing guidelines—as noted above, 
parole-abolition guidelines systems have slower-than-average 
prison growth.51 One reason for that may be a greater sense of 
responsibility that real-time sentencing imposes on sentencing 
judges: they cannot impose draconian prison terms, designed to 
look tough on crime and/or symbolically denounce the offender’s 
criminal behavior, while relying on the possibility (in practice, 
often illusory) of substantial mitigation by the parole board. 
• Parole-abolition guidelines make the time offenders will 
serve in prison very predictable, which permits more accurate 
assessments, at the time prison sentence durations are author-
ized and imposed, of the full fiscal impacts of severe penalties.52 
Most state guidelines systems now regularly conduct prison bed 
impact projections of sentence enhancements being proposed un-
der guidelines or criminal laws. 
• Abolition of parole gives the commission and the legisla-
ture a strong incentive to predict and control prison growth and 
prison overcrowding from the “front end” of the punishment pro-
cess (since such problems can no longer be controlled from the 
back end of the process). 
• Accurate prison population projections permit commis-
sions and legislatures to set priorities in the use of expensive 
prison beds and forces these policymakers to reconcile higher 
prison costs with other pressing budget needs—more punish-
ment for one group of offenders requires either less punishment 
for other offenders, cutting existing programs, or raising taxes.53  
 
 50. Frase, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 119. 
 51. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 105–06. 
 52. Id. at 109. 
 53. Id.  
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• Another inherent benefit of commission-drafted guide-
lines, especially combined with parole abolition, is that they help 
to mitigate what might be called the temporal correctional free 
lunch problem (akin to the intergovernmental free lunch Zimring 
has identified, where local officials consume state resources 
without paying for them). The temporal free lunch relates to the 
duration of prison terms, especially very long terms. Such severe 
penalties give elected state officials the immediate benefit of 
looking “tough on crime,” with no immediate fiscal cost to tax-
payers and no impact on current state budgets—the added cost 
of a three-strikes life-in-prison law, or even a “mere” five or ten 
more years in prison on top of the substantial prison terms al-
ready imposed, will be paid for many years in the future, when 
elected officials will have to either raise taxes, lower penalties 
for other offenders, or cut funding for non-prison programs. Here 
too, a sentencing commission, because of its comprehensive (cov-
ering-all-crimes) focus, more balanced composition, and relative 
degree of insulation from direct political pressures, is less likely 
to indulge in such short-term, fiscally irresponsible sentencing 
policy. 
In light of the guidelines characteristics and commission ac-
tivities described above, it therefore seems quite likely that the 
use of parole-abolition guidelines actually caused slower prison 
growth in many guidelines states. On the other hand, it is possi-
ble that the same features of guidelines and commissions may 
not be effective in substantially reducing current high levels of 
imprisonment. What worked “on the way up” to peak M.I. may 
not work as well on the way down. We now have almost a decade 
of post-peak data, but the results are inconclusive: in three of the 
four major sentence-structure groups (guidelines with parole, 
non-guidelines with parole, non-guidelines without parole) there 
were approximately equal numbers of states with above- and be-
low-average declines in rates of imprisonment following the na-
tional peak year.54 The fourth group, parole-abolition guidelines, 
tended to have below-average post-peak declines.55 But that pat-
tern might simply reflect the greater pre-peak success these sys-
tems had in restraining prison growth, and the fact that most of 
 
 54. See Adam Gelb & Jacob Denney, National Prison Rate Continues To 




 55. Id.  
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those state systems already had below-average prison rates in 
the peak M.I. year (so they felt less pressure to scale back their 
prison populations, even when lots of other states started doing 
so).  
III.  POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL ROLES FOR SENTENCING 
COMMISSIONS 
Given the risk of overloading sentencing commissions noted 
above, it is not clear that they can or should attempt to do more 
than the functions summarized above, to limit unnecessary 
prison commitments and long durations. But if we are optimistic 
that they could handle additional duties, and if we are concerned 
that existing commission activities are not likely to be effective 
in substantially reducing prison populations, here are some ad-
ditional duties we might want to give these commissions (some 
of which Zimring has already endorsed at least in some form). 
A. MANDATES TO IMPLEMENT ZIMRING’S OFFENSE-SPECIFIC 
PRISON-DIVERSION PROPOSALS  
Sentencing commissions could be directed to develop guide-
lines and/or make recommendations to the legislature to imple-
ment Zimring’s proposals to reduce or eliminate prison terms for 
certain groups of offenders, in particular56:  
• for most drug offenders, replace prison terms with com-
munity treatment;  
• for offenders convicted of low-level felonies, or charged 
with violating conditions of community release, convert 
short prison terms to even shorter local jail terms;  
• in cases of non-stranger assault, replace prison sentences 
with restorative justice alternatives. 
Most guidelines commissions already have a general man-
date to study all aspects of sentencing, including alternatives to 
prison, and make recommendations for needed improvements.57 
Legislatures desiring to roll back M.I. should add specific man-
dates to promote the kinds of decarceration proposals Zimring 
proposes.  
 
 56. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript chs. 6–7). 
 57. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.09, subd. 6 (2019) (directing the Minnesota 
commission to analyze sentencing information and conduct ongoing research). 
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B. MODIFIED VERSIONS OF ZIMRING’S THREE EXPANDED 
COMMISSION ROLES 
Each of the modified reform options below might prove use-
ful as a fallback proposal if Zimring’s full version lacks support, 
or to lessen the risks of overloading or politicizing sentencing 
commissions. 
Commission as Parole Board. In lieu of making all prison-
release decisions, commissions could be tasked with hearing ap-
peals from parole board denials of release. In addition, commis-
sions could issue guidelines encouraging judges to reduce sen-
tences for changed circumstances and for older offenders.58 
Administration of community corrections subsidies and 
charge-backs. A less burdensome and contentious version of this 
proposal would involve subsidies only. This would probably re-
sult in less need, compared with charge-backs, to assess each 
county’s valid rate of upward and downward departures. And the 
lost incentive of charge-backs for excessive prison sentencing 
might not be great, provided that subsidy funds can only be 
spent on community sentences. 
Commission research and published data on local prison-use 
decisions. Even without detailed data on charging decisions, 
prosecutor responsibility can be inferred from high prison rates 
and durations that are not attributable to high rates of upward 
guidelines departures by judges. And even without commission-
ordered charge-backs, data that identifies which counties are 
consuming “more than their share” of state prison beds can be 
reported to the legislature, which may enact charge-backs.  
C. IDENTIFYING STATEWIDE SENTENCING PRACTICES THAT 
REQUIRE GUIDELINES MODIFICATIONS 
Sentencing commissions can and should regularly evaluate 
prison-use patterns and revise guidelines when prison use devi-
ates from state policy. For example, the Minnesota commission 
found that increasing proportions of prison commitments were 
for property crimes, contrary to the commission’s policy to use 
community-based sanctions for most of these offenders.59 A ma-
jor cause of this shift was steadily rising criminal history scores 
 
 58. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 7) (suggesting restructured roles 
for commissions).  
 59. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE 3–4 (1990).  
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caused by prosecutor charging policies; the commission reversed 
this pattern by lowering the weight given to low-level (mostly 
property) prior felony convictions.60 
D. ADDRESSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 
In Chapter 10 of his book Zimring proposes a national com-
mission to study and promote reductions in the huge number of 
disabilities and other collateral consequences of felony convic-
tion (which often increase the risk of recidivism and thus con-
tribute to M.I.). Sentencing commissions are not given a role in 
this process, but perhaps they should be.61 Such a role is partic-
ularly appropriate with respect to the disparate impacts of such 
laws, given that reduction of racial disparities in punishment is 
a widely endorsed goal of sentencing guidelines reforms.62 Com-
missions could document and study the most frequently applica-
ble collateral consequences, and give judges guidance on how to 
take them into account, and, where appropriate, grant relief 
from their operation. Such judicial measures would better serve 
retributive and crime-control punishment goals by promoting 
sentence proportionality in the broader sense and by seeking to 
avoid making the offender even more socially disadvantaged and 
crime-prone.63  
E. PROPOSING A REDUCED SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT ACROSS 
THE BOARD 
The national prison rate could be cut substantially if a num-
ber of states (especially larger states or those with per capita 
 
 60. However, history scores later rose again, and the Commission made 
only minor further changes in criminal history scoring. In general, much more 
of this type of research and re-calibrating of guidelines rules needs to be done, 
especially in connection with criminal history which, among its many problems, 
sends far too many older and non-violent offenders in prison. For further dis-
cussion of the problematic aspects of calculating criminal history scores, see 
generally RICHARD S. FRASE & JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE 
CASE AGAINST PRIOR RECORD SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS 183–206 (2019). 
 61. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, art. 7 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed 
Final Draft 2017) (providing model for sentencing commissions to have a role in 
regulating collateral consequences of criminal convictions); FRASE, JUST SEN-
TENCING, supra note 2, at 221–34. 
 62. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING, supra note 2, at 226. 
 63. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(iv) (AM. LAW INST., 
Proposed Final Draft 2017) (stating that judges should “avoid the use of sanc-
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prison rates above the national average) were to lower the abso-
lute magnitude of their punishment scales. This is certainly 
something that a sentencing commission (with legislative sup-
port) could promote. As a matter of retributive proportionality 
and marginal deterrence (discouraging commission of more seri-
ous crimes), what matters is the relative, not the absolute, sever-
ity of punishment across crime types.64 Moreover, there is sub-
stantial research support for the conclusion that the current 
high rate of sentence severity in most U.S. states is not a cost-
effective way to control crime.65 A sentencing commission can 
point all this out and propose a new scale of punishment for the 
state that is relatively proportional across crimes but much less 
severe, much less expensive, and much less damaging to offend-
ers and their families. The commission can also point out that 
redeploying a large portion of the saved prison costs to commu-
nity supervision, treatment, and training programs would be 
much more effective in controlling crime. In other words, such a 
commission should ask its state’s citizens and elected officials: 
Why are we wasting so much taxpayer money on prison cells that 
many other states have shown are not necessary for ensuring 
deserved punishment and that are not the most cost-effective 
way to control crime? 
CONCLUSION 
Sentencing guidelines commissions like those operating in 
Minnesota and several other states have already helped to con-
trol overuse of imprisonment, especially when such guidelines 
are combined with abolition of parole-release discretion. Given 
the known strengths of such guidelines and commissions, it is 
likely that they can help states roll back Mass Incarceration in 
the ways Zimring proposes and/or in other ways. It is vital to 
ensure, however, that any added duties do not interfere with the 
important work these commissions are already doing. 
 
 64. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVED-
NESS OR DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 39–40 (1985) (not-
ing the special retributive importance of relative (“ordinal”) proportionality be-
tween offense and penalty severity); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., 
Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research 
(1999) (discussing marginal deterrence).  
 65. See FRASE & ROBERTS, supra note 60, at 73–83 (discussing the limited 
crime-preventative benefits of increased sentence severity); NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 130–55 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) (same).  
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 Rolling back M.I. will not be easy; indeed, Zimring doubts 
that the current American prison rate (440 inmates per 100,000 
residents, as of 2017) can be reduced to less than three times the 
stable rate that prevailed from 1925 to 1975, that is, to less than 
330 per 100,000.66 It is very hard to predict the effects of pro-
posed reforms designed to address a complex problem like M.I. 
or even to identify how we got M.I. in the first place. The poten-
tial causes of this phenomenon are many; and even if we think 
we know “how we got [up] here”—to persistently very high rates 
of incarceration—that doesn’t necessarily tell us how to get 
down. The best ways to roll back M.I. may not all mirror the 
causes of M.I., and the protective factors that helped some juris-
dictions avoid the worst M.I. effects may not all be equally effec-
tive in helping those or other jurisdictions cut back.  
Finally, although there may be widespread agreement that 
current prison rates are too high, there is probably much less 
agreement about how much lower they should be—how much im-
prisonment is “necessary,” and how can specific prison-rate-re-
duction targets be defined and defended? These are not just the-
oretical questions. Very ambitious M.I. rollback proposals (e.g., 
cutting the national prison rate in half) are likely to seem so un-
realistic to many observers as to be dismissed out of hand; more 
moderate (but still substantial) rollbacks in prison rates may ac-
tually be achievable. And in that case, Zimring’s backup pro-
posals—for improved prison conditions and reduced collateral 
consequences of conviction67—become all the more important. 
On the one hand, it seems very unlikely that Americans are 
four times more culpable today than they were fifty years ago, or 
four times more dangerous. On the other hand, many people be-
lieve that some criminal behaviors were not treated with suffi-
cient seriousness until the late twentieth century. Those behav-
iors include: domestic violence, acquaintance rape, repeat drunk 
driving, sexual abuse of children, child pornography, crimes com-
mitted against poor and/or non-white victims, and gun violence. 
Zimring argues that most of these crimes do not justify substan-
tially increased prison beds.68 But there is also another new fac-
tor: because criminal record systems have become more compre-
hensive and more accessible,69 sentencing courts today have 
 
 66. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript at preface); BRONSON & CARSON, 
supra note 41, at 1. 
 67. ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 10). 
 68. Id. (manuscript ch. 7 at 21). 
 69. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 13–31 (2015). 
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much more information about offenders’ true criminal pasts and 
likely future propensities.  
So, twenty-first century American incarceration rates prob-
ably need to be higher than the average mid-twentieth century 
nationwide rate of 110 prison inmates per 100,000 residents—
but how much higher? Zimring doesn’t specify an optimum or 
target prison rate, in part because he suspects that very substan-
tial reductions are unlikely. Another reason is that he believes 
incarceration rate measures should also count local jail inmates 
(a measure that raises U.S. incarceration rates by at least fifty 
percent);70 since jails also hold many persons awaiting trial, re-
ducing jail rates is an even more complex task. Moreover, Zim-
ring proposes to reduce prison populations by shifting many in-
mates to local jails, and that is a very good idea for the reasons 
Zimring cites—it will shorten custody-sentence lengths and keep 
offenders closer to their families and community resources. I 
would also note that heavy use of jail sentences for felons is a 
major reason why Minnesota has maintained one of the lowest 
incarceration rates of any state—even when jail inmates are 
counted.71  
With respect to prison sentences, however, I think it is use-
ful to specify all-states, federal, and state-specific targets for 
scaling back M.I. The all-states target prison rate should be 300 
per 100,000—that was the rate in the early 1990s, when crime 
rates peaked and began their steady decline,72 and it would rep-
resent a reduction of about one-quarter from the current all-
states rate of 390. The federal prison rate should decline even 
more, since it rose much faster than the all-states rate in the pre-
peak-M.I. period;73 cutting the federal prison rate to 25—what it 
was in the early 1990s—would represent a decline of about one 
half. For individual states the target should likewise be a one-
quarter reduction from their current rates. That would reduce 
each state’s rate to a level at or below the current all-states rate 
 
 70. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2016, at 2 tbl.1 (2018); ZIMRING, supra note 1 (manuscript ch. 5 at 21–22). 
 71. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Policies and Practices in Minnesota, 
OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2016) (contrasting custody-sentence rates for 
Minnesota—26% prison and 66% jail—with rates for all states—41% prison and 
28% jail). 
 72. BRONSON & CARSON, supra note 41, at 1 fig.1; ZIMRING, supra note 
1 (manuscript ch. 7 at 12–13); Carson, supra note 40. 
 73. Frase, Forty Years, supra note 2, at 10. 
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(390), except for the eight highest-rate states (Louisiana, Okla-
homa, Mississippi, Arkansas, Arizona, Texas, Missouri, and 
Kentucky). Those states (which have current prison rates rang-
ing from 527 to 719) should make more than one-quarter reduc-
tions, to at least reach the current all-states rate of 390. 
These are ambitious goals, but they are feasible and defen-
sible. With legislative support, sentencing guidelines commis-
sions can help to achieve these goals. 
 
